Off We Go into the Wild Black Yonder

In June 2018, the President directed the Pentagon to establish a “Space Force,” describing it as a sixth branch of the U.S. military. In August, Vice President Pence said, “Establishing the Space Force is an idea whose time has come. The space environment has fundamentally changed in the last generation; what was once peaceful and uncontested is now crowded and adversarial.”

Some scoffed and others applauded, but the truth is, nobody knows exactly what’s going to come out of this initiative. It would be the first time the United States has launched a new military service since the Air Force received its independence from the Army in 1947. Only an act of Congress can create a new military branch, but by making the proposal, the Trump Administration has started the ball rolling.

Most experts think there is a need for some sort of major reorganization. Mark Albrecht, the executive secretary of the National Space Council from 1989 to 1992 says, “Space is a place where there is now tens of billions of dollars” in infrastructure. Everything from financial transactions to the GPS that guides your car is controlled from space, or at least facilitated by space. Military activity in space is, therefore, “not materially different from the U.S. Navy, which goes around the Pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean, not to create trouble or to cause wars, but to make sure that all the things we enjoy are protected.”

Consider this, the U.S. military depends heavily on space for communications, reconnaissance, and detecting incoming missiles. Russia and China have been building surface-to-air missiles powerful enough to take out a satellite, a move that has U.S. officials increasingly concerned. In 2007, China even shot down one of its own aging weather satellites in a test of the technology, which the U.S. protested.

In the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Pentagon to study if and how it should reorganize its existing space programs to be more effective. An interim version of the study was published in March, but it is noncommittal about what was then called a unified “Space Corps.” Defense One reports that the full study calls for consolidating the U.S. military's space operations. That plan calls for establishing an entity akin to the cross-cutting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and creating a single government agency that would buy all of the military's satellites.

This is not a new idea, but one on which not everybody agrees. In 2000, a commission chaired by Donald Rumsfeld suggested building a Space Corps within the Air Force, an analogue to the Marine Corps within the U.S. Navy. From Eisenhower to Obama, the U.S. has seen space as a zone for self-defense and non-aggressive military activities. But by advocating for a Space Force, observers say that Trump is taking an unusually brazen tack. It sends a message to other countries around the world that the U.S. is looking aggressively at our future in space with respect to national defense. He is signaling that the U.S. is looking at space as a potential war-fighting domain—which is nothing new, but probably isn't helpful to international discourse.

So, before Congress does anything, they're going to want to dig through the most recent report and hear more of what the Department of Defense has to say. This idea has its supporters inside and outside Congress, who argue that space is now too important to lack a dedicated military branch. Mike Rogers, who chairs the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces says, “I personally think three or five years is the way to get it done without being too disruptive, because we have to keep using these assets while we’re in the process [of reorganizing]. The first thing [the Air Force] could do is just to come out of denial, admit we’ve got a problem and that we’ve got to fix it, and [then] work with us, instead of fighting us.” Rogers observed, “The Air Force has spent the last year on Capitol Hill fighting Congress trying to keep us from meddling in this issue.”

The timing of such a major change is complex. If it makes it into the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, the Pentagon would need to launch the new service in the span of a year to hit Rogers’ 3-year goal. So “three to five years” may not just be reasonable, but even optimistic.

That raises the question, “If a Space Force is created, what will it actually look like?”

In all likelihood, a Space Force would be stitched together from existing U.S. programs. At its center would be the Air Force Space Command, which has led the U.S.'s military space operations since 1982. Day-to-day, the Space Force would probably monitor Earth's satellites and take the lead on launching and maintaining military satellites, the command's current focus.

Already, the Air Force Space Command employs more than 36,000 people and maintains military technology such as the Global Positioning System satellite network and the mysterious X-37B space plane. The consulting firm Avascent says that the Air Force spends more than $7 billion per year just on unclassified space systems.

At its most elaborate, a Space Force would be on equal footing with the Army and Navy, replete with Pentagon offices and a service academy like West Point. However, its exact structure would depend on the enabling laws, which aren’t going to be passed this year.

Costs for the branch would vary, depending on how it was organized. In an interview with the Washington Post, National Space Council executive secretary Scott Pace said that the Trump Administration's proposed reorganization “should be budget neutral.” The Post also noted that the White House has asked Congress for an extra $8 billion over the next five years to bolster funding for national security systems in space.

That brings us to another big unknown: Assuming that the Space Force becomes reality, what are the legal and foreign policy implications? Most legal experts say that international law would limit what a U.S. Space Force could do.

That’s because all major space powers, including the U.S., Russia, and China, have signed the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The pact says that nothing in space can be claimed as a single country's territory, and it bars countries from stationing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction anywhere in outer space, including in orbit around Earth.

The treaty gets stricter when it comes to “celestial bodies” such as the moon and Mars. Parties can't build military bases, conduct military maneuvers, or test weapons of any kind—even conventional weapons—on another world.

But the so-called Outer Space Treaty does give countries some “wiggle room.” The Cold War-era treaty doesn't forbid intercontinental ballistic missiles, which enter and exit space on their way toward their targets. The treaty also doesn't specify whether conventional weapons can be used in open space or on space stations. In fact, in January 1975, the Soviet Union secretly test-fired a modified cannon from its space station.

Even the proposed branch's name could raise legal questions. That’s because there is a “term of art” in law called the “use of force,” and there is a huge body of law covering just what the term “Space Force” might imply. The beauty of terms like “Space Command” and “Space Operations” is that they side-step those landmines.

Regardless of what the United States does, China and Russia will move to ensure that they are prepared to deal with space-based threats. It can be argued that President Trump is merely acting to formalize a set of ad hoc policies and practices that are required to ensure that the United States is able to effectively repond.

Given this trend, we offer the following forecasts for your consideration.

First, over the next three-to-five years, a fight lies ahead on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon, over the roles, missions and budgets of any so-called “Space Force.”

There should be no question that the primary purpose of the Space Force is to achieve “space superiority.” America should be ready to deny any foe the use of, and access to, low Earth orbit and beyond. Under the accepted rules of international law, no nation can be denied the use of space for peaceful purposes. But when the shooting starts, “the USSF” must be ready to fight and win anywhere outside the atmosphere.

Second, deciding what exactly constitutes an act of war in space is not going to be easy.

One of the hardest jobs for Space Force leaders will be developing a doctrine that explains clearly how the U.S. intends to act if its space assets are attacked. But the idea that the U.S. can avoid an arms race in space is ridiculous. China and Russia are racing to develop and deploy a variety of antisatellite weapons.

Third, regardless of whether the public ever sees it, President Trump will order a comprehensive study of foreign space weapons programs.

It will draw from U.S. intelligence sources, as well as open sources, including the networks of amateur skywatchers who’ve spent years tracking ostensibly “secret” military space activities. Put into context, the already publicly available information will make the case for the Space Force better than anything the Pentagon is likely to come up with on its own. And,

Fourth, Arguments inside the Beltway over what exactly the Space Force is expected to do are going to be part of political debate for decades to come.

But if Mr. Trump and Vice President Pence can establish the basic premise that space superiority is the new service’s No. 1 mission, they will have made a real and lasting contribution to America’s national security.